now quite familiar brand of Lacanian theory laced with illustrative references to popular culture, and it is the deficient way in which he deploys this method that makes the book of limited interest-save perhaps as a reminder of the ahnost complete lack of contemporary scholarship dealing with the relation between Deleuze and Lacan.
Zizekis straightforward about the fact that a Lacanian encounter with Deleuze is not a dialogue; it is not a question here ofinterpreting what De1euze meant, let alone of 'getting him right' Rather, it is a matter of reading Deleuze against Lacanian theory, thereby developing something like a negative image that would expose a shift in Deleuze's thought-its "guattarization" -and explore the consequences of this shift. If ZiZek's book actua1ly staged this encounter, it would be interestingand weIl worth reading. Instead, Zizekis content, thtoughout the book, to bypass the work of articu1ating the concepts that would form the contours of such an encounter and instead produces a text whose argument is constituted ahnost entirely of rhetorical questions ("and is this not the same as that?") and innuendo (the perpetual use of "perhaps" as a pseudo-Iogica1 connector).
The book's thesis-which at times amounts to little more than an assertion-is that Deleuze's philosophical project, up to al1d including The Lngicof Se1JSe, is fissured by what appear to be two equally incompatible theses on becoming. On the one hand, Deleuze claims that sense is produced by actual material causes, hut that it is produced as an immaterial effect of these causes. For example, in The ißgj'c of Sense, Deleuze discusses nove1istic depictions of hattle in which a wounded character, put out of action, thereby becomes detached from the conflict and, through this detachment, allows the battle to take on a new sense, one no longer reliant upon the intentions of any of its participants. However, this understanding of the becoming of sense seems to contradict the other way that Deleuze speaks of it, as the becoming of material things from out of a virtual multiplicity. According to this second formulation, each material being is a singular instantiation of the cohesion of a virtual multiplicity. ZiZek does little to anchor this dichotomy in Deleuze's work----a lack that gives his resultant critique a certain air of naivete--drawing both sides of this "either/oi' not from Deleuze's texts but from Manue! DeLanda's book on Deleuze Intensive S(,ien(,~and Virtual Philosopfty (2002) . Leaving aside the question of the accuracy of DeLanda's reformulations, d1.e chief weakness of mek's book is that he is Wlable to ground bis central claim in Deleuze's work. Instead, Zizek's uncritical appropriation of DeLanda's dichotomy allows him to bring it to a tidy dialectical resolution.
ZiZek's first step in this resolution is to render the ontological either/or as the pair "Being and Becoming," wmch, in Zizek's reading, Deleuze unproblematically translates into the opposition of"the Good and the Bad" (28). Following this move, Being would be Bad insofar as it is conflated with the power of the State, molar assemblages, and the blockage of n~creative flows. Becoming, on the od1.er hand, would be Good insofar as it is, in a corresponding way, conflated with the liberation from (or revolt against) the power of the State, the formation of temporary, open, and transient assemblages or groups, and the valorization oE perpetual transformation. Ibis extension of the oppositional dichotomy in Deleuze is enabled through the collaboration with Guattari who, according to Zizek, offers an "easy escape" for Deleuze from the theoretical impasse of his ontological dilenuna. 1his easy escape not only results in a philosophical caricature of revolt and liberation, but also occludes the problematic status of the dilemma itself: In Zizek's opinion this occlusion is rectified in Alain Badiou's work, wmch ernphasizes the difference between Being and the Event By rigorously investigating this distinetion, their connection appears properly in relief, as a yet-to-be-explicated resonance between ontologically disrinet domains. Zizek's book is, at best, only suggestive of the possible directtons and derivations of such a project
In fleeing the problems of his ontology for the relative comfort of an apparendy radical cultural theory grounded in an alternative psychoanalysis, Deleuze shows himself to be, at bottom, "secredy BOOK RE\TIE\VS Hegelian" (69). Again, where an argwnentwould be effective in fleshing out this claim, one finds only insinuations and disttactions that do litde to inform the reader of the reasons for claiming an affinity between Deleuze's ontology and Hegel's dialectic. For Zizek, this affinity is best expressed in De1euze's treatment of the subject as "Gust another)
substance" (68). The subject, as the mere occasion for the production of sense, is identified with Becoming and therefore placed in opposition to Being. Tbis, in turn, repeats the Hegelian distinction between the "false" inftnite that mere1y goes beyond a given limit (the subject as Substance or Being) and the "true" infinite thatis the act of exceeding a limit (the subjeet as singular Becoming). Deleuze's dual ontology thus places bis philosophy precisely in the situation of the Hegelian dialectic that it seeks not merely to avoid, but in some sense to counter. Finally, the reason for the failure of Deleuze to .solve his ontological dilemma, as ZiZek interprets it, "is a rather ridiculous simplification, if not an outright falsification, of Lacan's position" regarding the Oedipus Complex, and psychoanalysis in general (80).
Again, presumably out of a desperate desire to escape the impasses of his double ontology of sense, Deleuze overlooks d1e complications of the Oedipus Complex in order to provide a figure of opposition for the proliferation of the liberated sexualities invited and advocated by Anti-Oedipus. Here Zizek hits upon an interesting thesis: that the very exemplarity of Oedipus, as Lacan treated the character in bis later ork, contests the typical interpretation of Freud's reading. Moreover, ZiZek points out that the resolution of the Oedipus Complex, the emergence of the child from the early, familial coordination, is also the emergence of the child into "the order of sense proper" (83); this emergence thus seems to function as a "deterritorialization." But a verbal slippage occurs here in the description of "symbolic casttation" that renders Zizek's either/or claim about Deleuze's ontology precarious at best. In symbolic castration, the phallus is detached from the physical body and, in the fact or ''Event'' of this separation, it constitutes an "incorporeal symbolic order." Returning to his earlier claim that the reality of the virtual is equivalent to the Lacanian Real, Zizek reformulates this constitution as the actuaIization of the virtual out of a preceding actua1, and thus seems to force the question of which came first, the virtual or the actual His resolution ofthis chickenand-egg problemis that the two actions-the actualization of the virtual, and the virtua1 meaning of the actua1-are "two sides of the same coin" (84). Pause for effect
